Andaya, Barbara Watson. “The Role of the Anak Raja in Malay History: A Case Study from Eighteenth-Century Kedah.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 7, no. 2 (1976): 162-86.

p. 180-81. In Tengku Long Putera’s attempts to regain power in Kedah in 1773, he apparently already had support pledged by Patani when he approached the Dutch in Perak for additional, maritime aid. Patani’s forces were to reach Kedah via ulu Perak, while four Dutch cruisers were to blockade the coast all the way from Perlis on down. The Dutch, however, did not join the cause.

Arasaratnam, Sinnappah. “The Coromandel-Southeast Asia Trade 1650-1740.” Journal of Asian History 18 (1984): 113-35.

p. 126. There is some evidence that in the mid 1670s, Coromandel merchants based in Bantam engaged in shipping ventures to other ports of the archipelago and elsewhere – to north Javanese ports, Borneo, Patani, and Ligor. These seem to have been undertaken with Malay and Javanese participation, perhaps including the support from the sultan. Sometimes European support was also sought in shipping and the Danes appear to have been particularly involved. Arasaratnam cites the Dutch Dahgregister as his source for this.

Azra, Azyumardi. The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia: Networks of Malay-Indonesian and Middle Eastern Ulama in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Asian Studies Association of Australia, Southeast Asia Publication Series, ed. Virginia Hooker. Honolulu: Allen & Unwin and University of Hawaii Press, 2004.

p. 111-12, 123. In the 18^th century, South Sumatra, South Kalimantan (Borneo), and the Patani region of the peninsula became prominent centers of Islamic learning in Southeast Asia. Azra argues that the birthplaces and ethnic origins of Malay-Indonesian scholars reflect the historical course of Islam in the archipelago through the centuries. Thus, many people in diverse areas recognized the importance of Islamic learning as well as the need for renewal and reform. These scholars, having acquired substantive credentials in Islamic learning, in turn stimulated further intensification of Islamization, particularly among their respective ethnic groups. The most prominent of these from Patani was Sheikh Dawud bin Abd Allah al-Fatani, along with a few other Malay-Indonesian scholars, one of the most important Islamic scholars of his day.

p. 113. The prominent scholar, Abd al-Samad bin Abd Allah al-Jawi al-Palimbani (1704-89), received his early education in pondok in Kedah and Patani (the pondok system of the peninsula is said to have started in Patani). Though he was born in Palembang, as his name indicates, his father came from Sana’a, Yemen to Kedah, where he was appointed Qadi (judge). Around 1700, his father moved to Palembang, married a local woman, and returned shortly after the birth of his son to Kedah.

p. 122-26. Azra gives a full account of the prominent Patani scholars who rose to prominence during the last half of the 18^th century. (FRB: I will not give a full account here, but this brief and somewhat fragmented account is definitely the best historical overview of Islam in Patani that I have seen).

Bonney, R. Kedah 1771-1821: The Search for Security and Independence. East Asian Historical Monographs, ed. Wang Gungwu. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.

p. 25. Immediately after the fall of Ayutthaya, Kedah and Patani asserted their independence from Siam, and at least in the case of Kedah, sent tribute to Ava instead. However, as Taksin emerged very quickly victorious in 1768, both states again returned their allegiance to Siam, for the time being.

Breazeale, Kenneth. “Thai Maritime Trade and the Ministry Responsible,” in From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya’s Maritime Relations with Asia, ed. Kenneth Breazeale, 1-54. Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of the Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1999.

p. 15. Within the context of trans-peninsular trade generally shrinking during the 18^th century, especially after the Burmese invasions of the 1760s-80s, the transit port of Mergui died out and its merchant community disappeared. Three trans-peninsular routes lingered on: one crossed at the narrowest point at the Isthmus of Kra, the second led from the west coast to the inland lagoon above Songkla, and the third was a longer route from Penang Island and Kedah to Patani and Songkla.

Charney, Michael W. Southeast Asian Warfare, 1300-1900. Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section Three: South-East Asia, v. 16, eds. V. Lieberman, et al. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

p. 139-40. Supposedly c. mid-century, elephants were regularly hunted in the environs of Patani. They would first tame a large elephant and ride it into the forest and let it loose there. As soon as it got into conflict with another elephant, hunters would run out and entangle its legs while its snout was entangled with the tame elephant. They were taken either for warfare or for its teeth, which were highly prized in China.

p. 216-17. In 1662 Nieuhoff estimated that Patani could bring, if it needed to, 180,000 soldiers to the field, via peasant conscription/levy.

Dhiravat na Pombejra. “Ayutthaya at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Was There a Shift to Isolation?” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Anthony Reid. Asia East by South. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993: 250-72.

p. 256-57. The usurpation of the throne of Ayutthaya in 1688 resulted in a number of regional revolts and wars between Adyudhya and its tributaries. Patani rebelled and in the war of 1691-92, the Patani army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ayutthaya forces, killing 6,000 Siamese troops. This emboldened Kedah to also refuse the bunga mas tributary payments and they imprisoned the Ayutthayan envoys in that country. Both of these conflicts remained stalemates for the remainder of the reign of King Phetracha.

Hall, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia. 4^th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.

p. 390. As a part of Louis XIV’s plans to convert the kingdom of Siam, he sent a number of ministers dressed as laymen who were to attain positions as governors of provinces, cities, and fortresses. To be successful in this endeavor, he thought it would be necessary to have two colonies of French soldiers in the country. He cleverly maneuvered de Chaumont into making a public affirmation of a French alliance. In return, he negotiated a draft agreement containing trade concessions, privileges for missionaries and the promise of the cession of Singora, near to Patani, on the east coast of the peninsula. These plans were all dashed, of course, with the events of 1688.

Hutchinson, E. W. Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1940.

p. 54-55. In 1677, Samuel Potts, an agent of the EIC, surveyed the west coast of the Gulf of Siam, looking for trade in tin and pepper. King Narai had apparently offered the English Patani as a trading base and would have allowed them to build a fortified fort there, but Potts reported that no trade could then be conducted there because Patani was carrying out one of its perennial revolts against Siam. Potts estimated that Patani’s pepper yield was approximately ¼ million pounds weight.

Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. Volume 2: Expansion and Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

P. 71. Patani’s population in 1690 is estimated at 15,000 based on estimates from the Tosen (see Ishii) which put the population at 10-20,000 people.

p. 289-90. The Japanese junk trade, tightly controlled at Nagasaki, declined with Cambodia and Patani after 1660, from Cochin China after 1680, and from Ayutthaya after 1689. Patani received 20 ships during 1651-60, 9 ships 1661-70, 2 ships 1671-80, 9 ships 1681-90, 7 ships 1691-1700, and 2 ships 1701-10.

p. 320. A Malay nakhoda arrived in Banten in 1655 with the news that Aceh, Patani, Perak, and Johor had all agreed to expel the Dutch, while Banten and Makassar were both to follow in 1656. Prophecies in Java told that God would give the victory to Mataram and other Muslim states if they united against the Dutch. Amangkurat I closed his ports to the Dutch in 1655-57 and exchanged ambassadors with Makassar but was in no position to take any stronger action.

Reid, Anthony. “Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 32, no. 3 (2001): 295-313.

p. 301. In both Batavia (from 1644) and Makassar (after the Dutch conquest, c. 1670), the leaders of the Malay maritime community were large traders from Patani – thus the second-generation of those who participated in the diaspora after the initial dispersal from Melaka. These were highly valued merchants and intermediaries. The Malay community of Batavia, estimated to be between two and four thousand people in the period 1680-1730, was led by a family with Patani roots. The population of this community rose sharply to 12,000 by the end of the 18^th century. When in 1732, the Kapitan Melayu was caught swindling his fellow-Malays in 1732, and exiled to Ceylon, he was found to have 329,000 rixaalders in property and hundreds of slaves. He must have been one of the richest men in not only Batavia, but all of Southeast Asia.

Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

p. 7. Mentions that the major ports for the Chinese junk trade in “Siam” were Ayutthaya, Thonburi, Bangkok, Chantaburi, Patani, Nakhon (Ligor), Songkla Chaiya, and others. This seems to be referring to the junk trade through the years.

p. 62. Patani (known to the Chinese as Pei-ta-nien) participated in active trade with ships from Fukien and Chekiang.

p. 65. In 1689, in order to strengthen control of Chinese trade at the port of Nagasaki, Japan instituted policy that regulated the schedule of when and how many Chinese ships could come to trade. Among the “summer” ships, there were 30 in total number: 3 from Ningpo, 3 from Chang-chou, 2 from Batavia, 1 from Cambodia, 1 from P’u-t’o-shan, 5 from Amoy, 5 from Patani, 4 from Foochow, and 2 from Canton. Chinese merchants did not send ships to Japan from Patani during the spring or autumn seasons.

p. 66. By the turn of the 18^th century, Japan experienced copper shortages and thus restricted its export. Japan appears to have ceased trading with Patani after 1709, when all such trade records cease. Japan ceased trade with Songkla and Ligor even earlier. New restrictions limited the total number of Chinese ships allowed to export copper, reducing the number from 80 to 30 in 1715. Ships to Patani, Songkla, and Ligor were not allotted any quota at all.

p. 250. Suggests that overseas trade in the 1780s only affected urban areas such as the agrarian-based city of Ayutthaya, and the indigenous commercial centers of Patani, Bangkok, and so forth, and that in areas lying beyond external trade was insignificant. Nevertheless, it played an important role in enhancing the position of the ruling class.

Sutherland, Heather. “The Makassar Malays: Adaptation and Identity, c. 1660-1790,” in Contesting Malayness: Malay Identity Across Boundaries, ed. Timothy P. Barnard, 76-106. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.

p. 83. The sultan of Pasir, a trading state on Borneo, is said to have been in debt to the Makassar-born prominent merchant, Ince Abdul, to the amount of 1,200 rds (rijksdaalders), for three cannon he brought from Patani. (FRB: Evidently, this suggests that the cannon foundry in Patani continued to function through the 17^th century from its beginnings in the 1560s-70s).

Wood, W. A. R. A History of Siam: From the Earliest Times to the Year A.D. 1781, with a Supplement Dealing with More Recent Events. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1926.

p. 167. There was a queen in Patani in 1679. From the evidence of a queen there in 1619 and 1679, Wood concludes that a queen always ruled the country at that time.

Wyatt, David K. Thailand: A Short History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

p. 107. Patani Malays were among the other supporters of Narai’s bid for the throne in 1656, which he took by force October 26, 1656, along with support from the Dutch, Japanese-Thais, and perhaps Persian Muslims. In general, foreign involvement seems to have been very strong from the beginnings of Narai’s reign.

p. 142. Patani, Lom Sak, and Terengganu sent tribute to Thonburi in 1769, thus showing their allegiance to Taksin’s new government. (FRB: It seems not until the murder of Taksin and the rise of the Chakri dynasty that Patani chose to rebel, which ultimately turned out to be a poor time – by that time central Siam had been consolidated under new leadership and Thonburi could afford to concentrate its resources on subjugating the southern polities).