Andaya, Barbara Watson. “Cash Cropping and Upstream-Downstream Tensions: The Case of Jambi in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Anthony Reid. Asia East by South. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993: 91-122.

p. 97-98. Following the rise in the pepper market of Jambi to many new competitors, Patani was no longer able to obtain adequate amounts of pepper for its own markets. The problem became so acute that the VOC closed its factory there in 1622.

Birdwood, George. Report on the Old Records of the India Office with Supplementary Note and Appendices. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1891.

p. 37. In a proclamation of the English King Charles I in 1631, among many items listed among England’s chief imports and exports appear “quilts of Pitania [Patania] embroidered with silk.”

p. 209. In 1610-11, Captain Hippon, on the “seventh voyage” for the English, opened a free trade at Patani, as well as at Pedapali, Masulipatam, but not at Pulicat, where they were prevented from doing so by the Dutch. (FRB: It is unclear whether this is referring, in fact, to the work of Floris in 1612; there is no other mention of the English arriving at Patani before Floris).

p. 211. In reference to the work of the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, sent by King James I to the court of Jehanghir, all of the EIC’s factories of 1617 are listed, among which is Patani, on the Malay Peninsula.

p. 234. As a part of a great list of all the factories established by the English in Asia between 1600 and about 1709, Patani appears on the “In Further India and the Malay Peninsula” list.

Cummings, W. “The Melaka Malay Diaspora in Makassar, c. 1500-1669.” Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 71, no. 1 (1998): 106-21.

p. 110. The Malays enjoyed great commercial success at the markets in Makassar. In 1625, an Englishman reported that most of the merchants sailing from Makassar to Moluku were Malays from Patani and Johor, who lived by the thousands in Makassar.

Das Gupta, Ashin. The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant 1500-1800: Collected Essays of Ashin Das Gupta. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

p. 47. In the 17^th century, merchants from the Coromandel Coast strengthened trade connections with Southeast Asian ports such as Aceh, Bantam, Makassar, Mergui, and Patani. Because of the Dutch semi-monopoly over spices, Indian merchants had to readjust trade networks and seek new commodities, such as pepper in Sumatra and tin in Malaya. This trade was also strengthened by the liberation of Bengali trade by the effective Mughal conquest of riverine Bengal.

Davies, D. W. A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas Trade. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961.

p. 70. Patani was the main avenue for Europeans to acquire Chinese goods and was known as “the door to China and Japan.” The market dealt in Chinese silk and porcelain extensively. Patani was also a common stopping place because provisions for crews were abundantly available. For the Portuguese and the Dutch, Patani was the way by which they accessed Chinese goods, at first, and the port from which the Dutch first sailed for Japan. In the 17^th century, the rulers of both countries (Japan and Patani) exchanged letters and the two ports of Hirado and Patani were called sister ports because of the brisk trade carried between them. The Dutch also first reached Siam via Patani.

Furber, Holden. Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800. Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion, ed. Boyd C. Shafer. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976.

p. 41-42. The English established a factory in Ayutthaya and Patani during the Seventh Voyage (1611-15). In the latter port, Chinese merchants came with silks and porcelains and Japanese merchants with copper came chiefly to buy hides and spices. Both ports welcomed the English as competitors with the Dutch, who already had factories in both places. The captain of this voyage, Keeling, was made “factor-general and supervisor of the factories and merchants in the East India and all other parts and places belonging to our trade,” by the factors in Gujarat, who also suggested grouping of the factories in four divisions under Surat, Bantam, Patani, and some place on the Coromandel Coast. Keeling ultimately chose instead to have two divisions: Surat and Bantam by 1618.

Glamann, Kristof. Dutch-Asiatic Trade 1620-1740. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958.

p. The pepper the Dutch acquired was generally grown in Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and Borneo, and was shipped from Bantam, from the ports on the west coast of Sumatra such as Indrapura and Priaman, and from the ports of the east coast such as Jambi, Indragiri, Kampar, from Aceh, and from Patani, Ligor, Sengora, and from Martapura and other ports in southeastern Borneo.

p. 112-13. Whenever the Dutch were unable to acquire Chinese goods directly from China, they would get them from neighboring ports, particularly Patani, where it was well-known that Chinese diasporic merchants traded.

Hall, D. G. E. A History of South-East Asia. 4^th ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981.

p. 323. The English established factories at Ayutthaya and Patani. Both were important markets for Chinese silk and porcelain as well as Japanese products. Spices also appeared in Patani, which imported them from the rest of the archipelago.

p. 380. The VOC established factories at Patani in 1602 and Ayutthaya in 1608, both of which were important centers for trade with Japan and China. The Japanese had apparently begun trading with the region as soon as King Naresuan’s victories over the Burmese provided relative peace in the region, making it inviting for commerce.

p. 382. Anglo-Dutch rivalry occasionally spilled over into the Siam-Patani region, where in 1619, for example, a sea battle between the Dutch and English killed the English captain John Jourdain (and his precious journal was also lost, detailing his activities in Patani in preceding years). However, the English closed both of their factories in Ayutthaya and Patani in 1622 and the Dutch also closed their factory in Patani. Trade had apparently not met the great expectations they had when they originally came to the region. The Dutch continued to trade in Ayutthaya, however, where their presence became stronger than ever.

Hutchinson, E. W. Adventurers in Siam in the Seventeenth Century. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1940.

p. 33. The English, first under Floris, then Denton, found little profitable trade in Patani or Siam in the early decades. They endeavored to obtain copper from Japan and ship it, via Patani, to England, by borrowing money from the queen of Patani. However, the ship Sea Adventure, sprung a leak and did not arrive in Patani until 1616, though it was welcome because it contained biscuits in jars and stationary to replace that which had been eaten by cockroaches. The copper trade, however, was killed by competition from the Japanese themselves.

p. 33-34. Having sustained losses due to the Dutch, the English held a council of war at Bantam in 1618 in which they decided to chase the Dutch ships off of the seas. The English captain John Jourdain, in accordance with the decision, captured the Dutch ship Black Lion at Patani and they hoped that the Dutch presence at Patani would then come to an end. But on July 17, 1619, three Dutch ships suddenly appeared at Patani and defeated Jourdain’s two ships, the Sampson and the Hound. Jourdain was killed in this battle. Further fighting in Patani followed in which the English had to petition the queen for her protection and though they received it, they had to pay a high price for it.

p. 34. After all of their problems, the English closed their factory in Patani in 1622, but not after awaiting the ship Bee which had Japanese porcelain with which they managed to settle their debt with the queen.

Ishii Yoneo. “Seventeenth Century Japanese Documents about Siam.” Journal of the Siam Society 59, no. 2 (1971): 161-74.

p. 165. In Japanese records, ships from Southeast Asian ports or okuminato, such as Tongking, Cambodia, Ayutthaya, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla, Patani, Melaka, and Batavia, were all known as okubune, or “inner ships.”

Meilink-Roelofsz, Marie Antoinette Petronella. Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962.

p. 142. Around 1605, Johor’s major trading partners were: Java, Makassar, and Patani, and slightly less also Cambodia and Siam.

p. 227-28. The author notes that Coen allowed a number of “free burghers,” that is, Dutch civilians, to carry out trade in some regions. But this apparently led to acts of piracy committed against foes, but also allies such as: Surabaya, Palembang, India, Johor, and Patani.

p. 233. In the 1620s, when rice was scarce, the Dutch had a share of the export of rice from Siam and Patani.

p. 265. Coen noted that Chinese goods brought 1/3 higher profit at Patani than at Bantam because of its nearer proximity to China, despite the much worse occurrence of extortion in Patani by its leading nobles.

p. 289. Malay junks from Patani brought pepper to Japara and traded it for salt there, in the period 1631-37.

Mills, L. A. British Malaya 1824-67. First published as volume 3, part 2 of the Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1925; reprinted Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1966.

p. 8. The English set up the factory in Patani in 1612 to acquire goods to trade at the markets at Japan and the Coromandel Coast.

Reid, Anthony. “Economic and Social Change, c. 1400-1800,” in Cambridge History of Southeast Asia – volume 1: From Early Times to c. 1800, ed. Nicholas Tarling, 460-507. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

p. 473. Cities of about 50,000 people included Patani, Surabaya (until its conquest by Mataram in 1621), the Cambodian capital, Kim-long (Nguyen capital in S. Vietnam), Ava (Burmese capital), and Vientiane. These were only dwarfed by the great metropolises of around 100,000 people, which included Thang-long, Ayutthaya, Aceh, Banten, Makassar, and Mataram.

p. 479. In the early years of the 17^th century, Siam, Patani, and Jambi all had interest rates of about 2% per month, which were comparable to rates in Europe and India. Reid sees this as an indication of a dependable and sophisticated money market in certain ports in Southeast Asia, though some were as high as 100% per annum, suggesting that certain ports were privileged over others.

p. 485. Most rulers issued their own coinage of gold or silver. In the Muslim states of the archipelago the small gold mas was the principal coin minted – by Pasai from the 14^th century onwards, and in the 17^th century by Aceh, Patani, Makassar, and Kedah. It was usually about a thousand cash or a quarter of a Spanish silver real in value. On the mainland, silver was more important.

p. 493. Sultan Amangkurat I (1646-77) of Mataram was bent on destroying all commerce not controlled by him, since it could lead to opposition. The Javanese traders of course transferred their operations to other centers such as Banjarmasin, Banten, Palembang, Patani, and Makassar, where they tended to assimilate into the “Malay” community.

p. 494. In the early 17^th century, the Chinese were the largest group of foreign merchants in the Vietnamese states, the Philippines, Patani, and Banten.

Reid, Anthony. “Islamization and Christianization in Southeast Asia: The Critical Phase, 1550-1650,” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Anthony Reid. Asia East by South. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993a: 151-79.

p. 158. Reid lists Patani among Hoi An, Ayutthaya, Cambodia, Banten, and Manila as Southeast Asian ports where Chinese merchants came to trade their wares for Japanese silver after the official ban on trade. This proceeded through the 1620s when silver bullion imports from America slowed, the Dutch progressively established hegemony over the maritime markets, and by mid-century the Chinese economy was in crisis, and the Japanese merchants no longer came to trade in Southeast Asia.

Reid, Anthony. “The Rise of Makassar.” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 17 (1983): 117-60.

p. 139. In 1625, Sihordt (a Dutch trader for the VOC) estimated that merchants from Patani and Johor sent 40 junks each year to Moluku to trade for spices and lived by the thousands in Makassar.

p. 139-40. According to Reid, a number of prominent Patani nobles made their home in Makassar. Around 1620, an uncle and a sister of the queen of Patani established themselves after some internal conflict in Patani. The uncle, Maharaja Lela, became thenceforth the leader of the Makassar Malays.

Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. Volume 1: The Lands below the Winds. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

p. 21. Cambodia exported about 7,000 tons of rice per year around 1600, and in so doing, supplied Patani, Pahang, and Brunei.

p. 21-22. Songkla and Nakhon Si Thammarat exported about 800 tons of rice per year to Patani and Pahang.

p. 91. Around 1600, Cambodia exported cotton to ports as far south as Patani.

p. 112. The Chinese traded iron products through the centuries and such items were counted among the most common of Chinese goods in the region. First Melaka until 1510, and Patani a century later served as the main redistribution points for iron items for Southeast Asian markets. Trader from Borneo brought back iron products from Patani.

p. 133. Melaka and Patani both had labor forces that were composed mostly of Javanese. After Patani’s conversion to Islam, it could no longer draw slaves from Islamic areas, according to Islamic belief. Therefore, by the 17^th century, it got slaves from Cambodia, Champa, and Borneo.

Reid, Anthony. Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce. Volume 2: Expansion and Crisis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

p. 18. Five Japanese red-seal ships arrived in Patani in the period 1604-05 and two more in 1611-15.

p. 26. Most Japanese and Manila (galleon) silver was absorbed by the Chinese market, especially in the 1610s-20s, but a large proportion of it arrived there via the ports of Hoi An, Manila, Patani, Ayutthaya, and Cambodia, and this flow of currency played a major role in the development of those ports as major market centers.

p. 77. In the early 17^th century, Patani relied upon imported rice for approximately half of its needs. Banten, in contrast, imported ¾ of all its rice.

p. 120. In Patani in 1604, a Malay of Chinese origin, Datu Sirinara, had the greatest influence over the sultanate’s commercial affairs.

Sarasin Viraphol, Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977.

p. 9. Mentions that the main competition with the Portuguese came from the Dutch; the VOC established trade connections with Patani and Ayutthaya during their early years of involvement in intra-Asian trade.

p. 10. The English established factories in Ayutthaya in 1612 and in Patani in 1615. The English tried to use Siam and lower Siam as a base for acquiring goods brought in by visiting junks, and to send deerskin, buffalo horns, and sapanwood from lower Siam to sell to Japan and China.

p. 15-16. Shogun Hideyoshi began to dispense shu-in (licenses) to merchants of Kyoto, Nagasaki, Sakai, and others (backed by the various feudal lords), who had gained a great deal of economic power by the late Ashikaga period. These were for ships destined for Annam, Ligor, and Patani. After the country finally united under Shogun Ieyashu, the policy of encouraging native shipping continued. Siam became one of the principal trading partners. In the period 1604-35, of the 355 licenses issued for ships to go to Southeast Asia, 55 were recorded as having traded directly with Ayutthaya, while 7 went to Patani. This trade boomed during the first three decades of the 17^th century and reached his apex during the reign of King Songtham (1611-28). Hirado and Patani were dubbed “sister ports.” The Japan-Siam trade seems to have benefited from the general political disorder ongoing in China at that time. Sarasin sights several Japanese sources for this information.

p. 62. Patani, Songkla, and Ligor all formed an integral part of the “triangular trade” between Siam-Japan-China from the early 17^th century onwards. Lower Siam became even more active after the lifting of the trade ban in 1684 because they possessed large quantities of tin and hides, both of which were in great demand in the Nagasaki market. Patani interacted most commonly with ships from Fukien and Chekiang. This allowed Chinese to trade in Patani free of port duties (a practice which dates back as early as 1566 when the pirate Lin Tao-ch’ien of Ch’ao-chou settled there with his gang). In the 17^th century, the Japan-Patani trade was mainly in the hands of the Japanese and south Fukienese. After the rupture of relations between Japan and Siam in 1629, trade between Patani and Japan remained firmly in the hands of Chinese ships which carried products from Patani to Nagasaki. Sarasin points to Kanemitsu Kanazawa’s Wa-Kan senyo shu (1761) which stated that Chinese ships went to Patani and took goods from there to Nagasaki. Nishikawa Tadahide, writing a half-century earlier, also commented that Chinese ships from Patani were called “Patani ships” and that local inhabitants did not send out vessels of their own. The first “Patani ship” is said to have sailed in 1648. Thus the triangle trade occurred with ships from Fukien or Chekiang to Patani where it discharged its cargo for an indigenous one, organized a new crew, and sat sail for Japan. Sometimes such ships were sold to Patani Chinese upon arrival. No less than 18 ships traded between Patani and Nagasaki during the last two decades of the 17^th century during which time trade had been liberalized and Chinese merchants from Fukien and Chekiang could conduct this trade legally. The products most commonly traded in this network were pepper, tin, honey, birds’ nests, dried shrimp, buffalo horn, and wax.

Schrieke, B. Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. Part One. The Hague: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1955.

p. 20-21, 29. Citing Dutch records, he shows that c. 1615, merchants from Japara, Grise, and Surabaya, chief among the Javanese merchants, carried on the great volume of trade throughout the archipelago.   With the eastern monsoon, they went to the Straits of Melaka, Sumatra, Palembang, Borneo, Patani, and Siam. Japara appears to gave held the closest connection with Patani. Ships from Japara went to Melaka, Aceh, Jambi, Indragiri, Palembang, Patani, and Siam, usually taking rice. Schrieke also points to Patani as the center of the Borneo diamond trade once that trade fell into the hands of the Chinese in the Ming period. This had previously been in the hands of the Javanese.

p. 50. Bantam, Aceh, and Patani all quickly recognized the sudden rise in demand for pepper upon the arrival of the Dutch in the early 17^th century and all three places attempted to monopolize the production of pepper to the greatest extent, and raised their prices extraordinarily to profit from the shift in demand.

p. 51. Before 1603, Aceh mainly drew its pepper from Pidie, Patani, the west coast of Sumatra, Kedah, Indragiri, and Jambi. Aceh’s importance declined in the late 16^th century, but again grew upon the coming of the Dutch and English, and declined once those two powers began to go elsewhere.

p. 54. During Aceh’s expansion on the peninsula against Pahang (1618), Kedah (1619), and Perak (1620), Patani aided Kedah against this invasion, though Kedah nevertheless fell to Aceh. At the same time, Patani’s trade declined because of restrictions placed upon Chinese and other merchants who came to trade there, but even moreso by Aceh’s destruction of pepper-producing areas on the peninsula. Earlier it had drawn pepper from Jambi, Perak, Kedah, and Pahang. Previously, Patani had supplied Aceh as well as Grise, with pepper, but they stopped such shipping when the Dutch and English came to get pepper from Patani itself. From 1615 onward, the Dutch began to obtain pepper directly from Jambi and the amount shipped to Patani became completely insufficient to meet demand. Coen recognized this and made controlling the pepper trade from Jambi one of his main goals, much to the detriment of Patani, Melaka, Johor, and Grise, who had formerly imported pepper from there.

p. 65-66. Dutch records show that among the most prominent local merchants in Ambon who competed with the Dutch were from Minangkabau, Johor, Patani, Japara, Grise, Jaratan, and Bantam, even though all of these groups generally based themselves in Makassar.

Tien-Tse Chang. Sino-Portuguese Trade from 1514 to 1644: A Synthesis of Portuguese and Chinese Sources. Leyden: Late E. J. Brill, Ltd., 1934.

p. 113. In 1604 the Dutch, like the Portuguese a century earlier, began their operations in Patani, as the door to trade with China. Admiral van Waerwijck embarked from Patani to go to Canton.

p. 124. As part of the Dutch strategy to chase the Portuguese out of trading with China, they tried first to make trade agreements with Chinese traders at disparate ports, primarily: Bantam, Grisee, Patani, and Moluku. This trade, however, was ultimately unsatisfactory, particularly because the Dutch found products acquired in this way to be of poor quality, among other complaints. Thus they tried to take Macao from the Portuguese, though they failed in this endeavor.

Van der Cruysse, Dirk. Siam and the West 1500-1700, tr. Michael Smithies. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2002.

p. 36, 40. Van Neck, having been unable to obtain sufficient quantities of spices in Moluku, sailed for Patani, arriving there November 7, 1601. After three days of negotiations with the queen, and despite protests by Portuguese, Chinese, and Japanese merchants, he concluded an advantageous agreement with Patani. She allowed them to set up a factory and to trade in pepper. They found Patani to be a good spice market, at least initially. They set up eight permanent merchants who represented the Dutch in Patani. Heemskerck also arrived and left ten more men to sell his goods. By the end of 1602, the Dutch had 26 men stationed at Patani. At that time, three separate companies were operating in Patani, but with the creation of the United East India Company (VOC) in 1602, they became one, no longer competing with one another there.

p. 44. Admiral Van Warwyck arrived in Patani in 1603 and oversaw the joint VOC operations. The Dutch saw Patani as the door to China and when an emissary of Phra Naresuan told him that Siam sent an embassy to China every year, he negotiated for a Dutch representative to accompany this group to try to forge Dutch relations with China. Cornelis Specx and the admiral’s nephew took the letter to the king in June 1604, where they were well-received, but an expedition against the Burmese, the death of the king, and the accession of his successor delayed the mission. They were recalled to Patani in 1606.

p. 55. One of the attractions of Siam to the English was their connections to Japan. The English encountered Japanese merchants in Ayutthaya and Patani and the Japanese sought English muskets and other firearms on order from shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu.

Van Leur, J. C. Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History. Selected Studies on Indonesia. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1955.

p. 134, 379. The author notes the active participation of Patani noblemen in Southeast Asian trade. The orang kaya Sri Maharaja Indra shipped arrack to Moluku in someone else’s ship, for example, and the shahbandar and the datuk besar owned ships and carried on freight shipping. It appears that ships owned by the former nobleman were captured by the Dutch in Moluku in 1617, and they insisted on arresting him and reprimanding him (apparently for breaking some agreement they had established earlier). Van Leur cites specific Dutch sources for this.

p. 186. The author claims that direct Dutch trade with Patani lapsed in 1622 because of the foundation of Batavia and the VOC closed its factory there in November 1622.

p. 207. In 1619, Dutch records show that ships owned by the queen of Patani sailed to Palembang.

p. 216. The Dutch official, Caen, commander of the fleet patrolling Macao and Manila, wrote in 1632 that the Patani pepper market was no longer worth visiting, stating that quantities were so low that ships trading there the year before had taken everything and that no pepper remained there for trading.

p. 378. In 1607, Dutch officials complained that the most powerful merchants of Patani tried to buy all of their products so that they would gain a monopoly over products, thus frustrating the Dutch merchants at the factory there.

p. 380. The author details the Dutch desire to trade with the Chinese and Japanese at Siam and Patani. They saw the two ports as the major entrepots for trade with those countries in the early years of their presence in Southeast Asia. He cites specific sources in his study.

Vlekke, Bernard H. M. Nusantara: A History of the East-Indian Archipelago. European Business: Four Centuries of Foreign Expansion, ed. Mira Wilkins. New York: Arno Press, 1977.

p. 198. Thousands of Dutch engravings were sent to the market of Patani in the early days of the company. Their images ranged from Madonnas and Biblical nature scenes, nudes, and other pictures. Vlekke argues that these represent a misunderstanding on the part of the Dutch of the people of the archipelago, because these engravings did not have an economic appeal. (FRB: From this same tradition of craftsmanship, however, they also produced the engravings of the queen in the procession that illustrates the cover of the Hikayat Patani published by Teeuw and Wyatt).

Wood, W. A. R. A History of Siam: From the Earliest Times to the Year A.D. 1781, with a Supplement Dealing with More Recent Events. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1926.

p. 167. In the battle between the Dutch and English at Patani in 1619, the English on shore were only saved from massacre by the intervention of the queen.